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Abstract
How did the financial crisis affect population welfare in EU member states in key
dimensions such as income, health, and education? We seek to answer this question
by way of welfare comparisons between countries and within countries over time,
using EU-SILC data. Our study is novel in using a multidimensional first order
dominance comparison approach on the basis of multi-level ordinal data. We find
that the countries most often dominated are southern and eastern European mem-
ber states, and the dominant countries are mostly northern and western European
member states. However, for most country comparisons, there is no dominance
relationship. Moreover, only a few member states have experienced a temporal
dominance improvement in welfare, while no member states have experienced a
temporal dominance deterioration during the financial crisis.
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1 Introduction
The recent financial and economic crisis has had a major impact on EU member states.
The effects on key macroeconomic indicators at the country level such as GDP growth,
public debt, inflation, etc. have been widely analyzed (e.g., European Commission, 2009).
It has also been shown that the financial and economic crisis has affected income at the
individual level (e.g., De Beer, 2012). However, it has long been recognized that welfare is
a multidimensional phenomenon, which is not adequately measured by income (e.g., Sen,
1970, 1976, Arrow, 1971, Kolm, 1977), and much less is known regarding the impact of
the crisis on welfare when taking a multidimensional view. Two questions are examined
in this paper: How has the crisis changed the relative multidimensional welfare of EU
member states? Has multidimensional welfare improved or deteriorated for each state
during the financial crisis?
Previous multidimensional welfare comparisons of European countries have used meth-
ods that rely on a priori assumptions about the relative importance of different dimensions
of welfare and a weighting scheme reflecting these. Examples of such methods are the
Human Development Index (HDI), which focuses on three dimensions of welfare, namely a
long and healthy life, being knowledgeable, and having a decent standard of living (UNDP,
1990, 2014), and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) (e.g. Alkire and Apablaza,
2016). The approach of assigning weights to each dimension, and thereby defining a single
composite measure of welfare, is convenient for applications since it enables the analyst
to make a complete ranking of the populations being compared. However, a challenge
when applying such an approach is that there is no natural or generally agreed method-
ology on how to set the weights, and in practice the weights are often set equally in each
dimension. As Ravallion (2011) points out, the producer of the index is essentially free to
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set the unusually large number of ”moving parts” that make up the index.1 Even if there
is wide agreement that one dimension should be given a higher weight than another, it is
rarely clear how this should be translated into actual weights. In addition, it is likely that
there are significant differences in EU member states’ preferences for different dimensions
of welfare. One specific weighting scheme may thus not be appropriate to describe generic
preferences in all European countries.
The challenges described above have fostered a focus on dominance methods that are
robust to different weighting schemes in multidimensional welfare comparisons. These
methods enable comparisons across different weighting schemes or, put differently, broad
classes of underlying social welfare functions (e.g., Atkinson and Bourguignon, 1982, 1987,
Bourguignon, 1989, Atkinson, 1992, Bourguignon and Chakravarty, 2003, Duclos et al.,
2006, 2007, Gravel et al., 2009, Gravel and Mukhopadhyay, 2010, Duclos and E´chevin,
2011, Muller and Trannoy, 2011, Gravel and Moyes, 2012). However, while the above
mentioned studies develop methods that offer great flexibility in terms of weighting of
dimensions, these methods all assume that the indicators are suitably scaled (or one out
of two as in Gravel and Moyes, 2012), i.e., the methods are not suited for the analysis of
ordinal data. Specifically, a common feature of the above-mentioned studies is the appli-
cation of conditions that are typically formulated in terms of specified signs on the second
(or higher) order partial or cross-derivatives of the underlying social welfare function.
In this paper we make multidimensional population welfare comparisons without re-
lying on a priori chosen weights, nor on methods that require assumptions about the
substitutability/complimentarity between dimensions. The natural concept for such com-
parisons is first order (stochastic) dominance (FOD), also known as the usual stochastic
order in probability theory (e.g., Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007). One finite distribution
first order dominates another finite distribution if the other distribution can be obtained
from the first by iteratively shifting probability mass from better to worse outcomes. The
approach provides a way of making comparisons of multidimensional welfare that is robust
to different weighting schemes. That is, it allows comparisons without making assump-
1Ravallion (2012) refers to this as ”mashup indices”.
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tions about utility functions and/or social welfare functions other than nondecreasingness.
Thus, ordinal indicators can be used for population welfare comparisons (Arndt et al.,
2012); i.e., it is only required that outcomes can be ranked from worse to better within
each dimension.2
Previous applications of FOD for welfare comparisons have used only binary indicators
(see, e.g., Arndt and Tarp, 2017, for a collection of studies applying FOD in developing
countries using binary indicators). In this paper, we use multi-level indicators; i.e., within
each indicator, more than two levels are allowed. In our comparisons of EU member
states, we include three multi-level indicators of the welfare dimensions income, health,
and education, which have four, five, and three ordered levels, respectively, yielding a total
of sixty different outcomes. We make spatial analyses of countries relative to each other
within a given year as well as temporal analyses of countries over time. We find between
40 and 45 multidimensional spatial dominances in each of the three years analyzed (2005,
2009, and 2013) out of 276 potential dominances each year. We find only a few temporal
dominances.
In the multidimensional spatial analyses, the countries that are most often domi-
nated are southern and eastern European countries (Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain), whereas the dominant countries are most often
northern and western European countries (Austria, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom).3 In the multidimensional temporal analyses, only a
few countries have experienced a FOD improvement in welfare and no country has experi-
enced a FOD deterioration in welfare over the period. When a multidimensional analysis
that includes more than just income is conducted, the financial crisis thus did not lower
broadly defined population welfare. Different patterns often appear from the separate
one-dimensional analyses. These findings highlight the importance of a multidimensional
view in welfare analyses.
2The present paper focuses on comparisons of welfare in population distributions with ordinal multi-
dimensional data. For comparisons of inequality across populations with (partially) ordinal multidimen-
sional data, we refer to Gravel and Moyes (2012) and Sonne-Schmidt et al. (2016).
3See Tabel A1 in Appendix 1 for a grouping of countries to specific regions.
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews related empirical literature
on multidimensional welfare in Europe. Section 3 describes the concept of FOD in a
multidimensional welfare setting, followed by a description of a method for identifying
dominances empirically and the Copeland (1951) method for providing a ranking based
on pairwise dominance comparisons. Section 4 describes the EU-SILC data applied. The
results are shown in Section 5 and discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related empirical literature
To the authors knowledge, there is no previous literature that applies multidimensional
dominance concepts in a country comparison setting in Europe (with the exception of
Hussain, 2016, discussed later in this section). The empirical literature most closely re-
lated to the present paper is the group of studies which has calculated summary indicators
of welfare for European population groups.
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) publishes the Human Develop-
ment Index (HDI) for most of the world’s sovereign countries and states as a measure of
progress in a given country (UNDP, 2014). Their focus is on three dimensions of wel-
fare, namely a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable, and having a decent standard
of living. The indicators of each dimension are life expectancy at birth, mean years of
schooling and expected years of schooling, and purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted
gross national income (GNI) per capita, respectively. Both the two intra-education in-
dicators making up the education dimension and the three dimensions in the HDI are
weighted equally by 1
2
and 1
3
, respectively.4 All EU member states in the present study
have ”very high human development” in the years analyzed in the present study (UNDP,
2011, 2014).5 western and northern European member states are typically ranked higher
(i.e., they have a higher HDI) than southern and eastern European member states.
4Note that there can be multiple indicators for the same welfare dimension as exemplified here, where
both mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling are used as indicators in the education
dimension. In this paper, we use one indicator for each welfare dimension included.
5In, e.g., 2013, the cut-off point for being in the ”very high human development” category was 0.8.
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The UNDP also publishes the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI, sometimes de-
noted M0), but only for developing countries. Furthermore, the year of the surveys used
to calculate the MPI in a given year differs significantly (e.g., UNDP, 2014, Table 6,
pages 180-181). However, in a recent paper, Alkire and Apablaza (2016) (building on
Alkire et al., 2014) explore multidimensional poverty in Europe using MPI on EU-SILC
data in 2006, 2009, and 2012 following the Alkire-Foster methodology (Alkire and Fos-
ter, 2011a,b, Foster et al., 1984, and see also Alkire et al., 2015). The MPI applied in
Alkire and Apablaza (2016) includes twelve binary indicators in six dimensions: income,
employment, material deprivation, education, environment, and health.6 As in UNDP
(2011, 2014), western and northern European member states are typically ranked higher
(i.e., they have a lower MPI) than southern and eastern European member states.
Other studies of multidimensional welfare and poverty in a European country compar-
ison context are available in the literature. They generally consider dimensions and/or
indicators that are very different from the ones used in the present paper (see Section
4 for a description). For example, Bossert et al. (2013) use a weighting scheme and a
deprivation approach on EU-SILC data of arrears, inability to keep the home adequately
warm, lack of capacity to face unexpected required expenses, and inability to afford a
meal with meat, chicken, or fish (or a vegetarian protein equivalent) every other day, a
one-week annual holiday away from home, a car, a washing mashine, a color TV, and
a telephone. Whelan et al. (2014) apply a deprivation approach and the Alkire-Foster
methodology on basic deprivation, consumption deprivation, health, and neighbourhood
environment using EU-SILC data. Hussain (2016) applies the HDI, MPI, FOD, and more
on EU-SILC data of deprivations similar to those used in Bossert et al. (2013). This
is the only other empirical application of FOD on European countries. As other previ-
ous applications of FOD for welfare comparisons, Hussain (2016) uses binary indicators.
Permanyer and Hussain (2017) combine multiple scenario simulated data with observed
6For example, an indicator in the health dimension is that the respondent considers her own health
as fair or above, and the indicator in the education dimension is whether or not the respondent has
completed primary education.
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data from 48 Demographic and Health Surveys around the developing world to provide a
methodological comparison of FOD with other multidimensional measures, including the
MPI.
3 Methodology
Suppose that welfare is measured in N dimensions and let X ⊆ RN be a finite set of
multidimensional outcomes. A distribution of welfare is described by a probability mass
function f over X (i.e.
∑
f(x) = 1 and f(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X). We refer to f as a
distribution. A subset Y ⊆ X is a lower comprehensive set (LCS) if x ∈ Y , y ∈ X, and
y ≤ x implies y ∈ Y (for an illustrative example, see Appendix 2). A distribution f first
order dominates distribution g if
(i)
∑
x∈Y
g(x) ≥
∑
x∈Y
f(x) for all Y ⊆ X.
It is well-known that condition (i) of multidimensional FOD is equivalent to the follow-
ing two definitions: (ii) g can be obtained from f by a finite number of shifts of probability
mass from one outcome to another that is worse, and (iii) social welfare is weakly higher
for f than for g for any nondecreasing additively separable social welfare function; i.e.,∑
x∈X f(x)w(x) ≥
∑
x∈X g(x)w(x) for any weakly increasing real function w(·).7,8
Note that FOD only requires ordinal data and that it is absent of assumptions about
the strength of preferences for each dimension, the relative desirability of changes among
7The first proof of the equivalence between (i) and (iii) is usually attributed to Lehmann (1955)
(however, see also Levhari et al., 1975). The first formulation and proof of the equivalence between (i)
and (ii) is not easy to trace back to its roots, but Kamae et al. (1977) observed that the equivalence
between (i) and (ii) is a corollary of Strassen’s Theorem (Strassen, 1965). Østerdal (2010) provides a
constructive direct proof of this for the finite case.
8In the one-dimensional case, f first order dominates g if and only if F (x) ≤ G(x) for all x ∈ X,
where F (·) and G(·) are the cumulative distribution functions corresponding to f and g, respectively. For
a review of FOD in both a one-dimensional and multidimensional welfare setting using binary indicators,
we refer to Siersbæk et al. (2017).
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levels within or between dimensions, and the substitutability/complementarity among the
dimensions (Arndt et al., 2012) as mentioned in Section 1. This makes FOD applicable
to a wide range of indicators, whereas, e.g., dominance concepts following Atkinson and
Bourguignon (1982) and Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) are not suited for the analysis
of ordinal data.9
Using definition (ii), Mosler and Scarsini (1991) and Dyckerhoff and Mosler (1997)
show that identifying FOD corresponds to checking if a certain linear program has a
feasible solution. The first empirical implementation of this approach was provided by
Arndt et al. (2012) in a study of child poverty in Mozambique and Vietnam with multiple
binary indicators (see also Arndt and Tarp, 2017). In this paper, we identify dominances
using definition (i), which is an exact test of dominance. To the authors’ knowledge,
this approach has not previously been applied to identify multidimensional population
welfare.10
When we test for FOD using definition (i), one challenge is that the number of LCSs
increases drastically when more dimensions and/or levels are included in the analysis.11
One has to carefully consider the number of dimensions as well as the number of levels
of each indicator, as there is a trade-off between adequate characterization of welfare and
increasing computational complexity of checking dominances. We first identify all LCSs
using an iterative algorithm available from the authors. After the identification of all
LCSs, checking for FOD using definition (i) is straightforward.12
9The less restrictive of these are instances of orthant stochastic orderings (see Dyckerhoff and Mosler,
1997) although the name ”first order dominance” has sometimes been used synonymously for these.
10While linear programming is computationally faster, the approach may be challenged by numerical
instability (see, e.g., Higham, 2002, for a general treatment). This may lead to the conclusion that a
dominance exists when in fact there is no dominance (but ”close”).
11The number of LCSs is quantified by Sampson and Whitaker (1988) using the number of levels in each
indicator. Strictly speaking, Sampson and Whitaker (1988) provide the number of upper comprehensive
sets, which is, however, equal to the number of LCSs. For three dimensions with binary indicators, the
total number of LCSs is 20. If the number of levels of each indicator is three, the total number of LCSs
is 980, and if four levels of each indicator are used, the total number of LCSs increases to 232,848.
12The Matlab code for identifying all LCS and checking FOD is available on the following web-
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When comparing two populations it may be the case that none of them dominates
the other. Thus, generally we are unable to obtain a complete ranking of all populations
by way of FOD comparisons. However, the Copeland (1951) method can be used as a
measure of the tendency to outperform other populations as an overall relative indicator
of population well-being (Arndt et al., 2016, Siersbæk et al., 2017), which can be applied
to the spatial analyses to obtain a ranking of the compared populations. The Copeland
method involves counting, for each of the n populations, how many of the n − 1 other
populations it dominates and subtracting the number of times it is dominated by the
other populations. The corresponding Copeland score is in the interval [−(n− 1);n− 1],
which is normalized to [−1; 1].
4 Data
The data applied are from the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC)
database. We focus on the years 2005, 2009, and 2013 (i.e., before, during, and after the
financial and economic crisis). As of 2005, the EU-SILC data cover all of the 25 member
states at the time. The EU member states Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania are therefore
not included due to entry into the EU in 2007, 2013, and 2007 respectively. Furthermore,
Malta is omitted due to insufficient data. The sample sizes for the member states range
from 5,429 to 47,311 respondents in a given year (a complete overview is shown in Table
A3 in Appendix 3). All the data are collected based on the same (translated) questions
in all EU member states using representative samples. We include three key dimensions
of welfare: income, health, and education. Income is used in most measures of welfare.
Health and education are prevalent in many measures of multidimensional welfare (e.g.,
World Bank, 1990, Alkire, 2002, UNDP, 2014, Alkire and Apablaza, 2016), and they have
page: https://sites.google.com/site/nikolajsiersbaek/code. The empty LCS and the full set
of all outcomes are omitted in the code since the corresponding sums using definition (i) are 0 and
1, respectively. Computationally efficient algorithms capable of handling several indicators and levels
is grounds for further research. For the bivariate case, efficient algorithms are provided in Range and
Østerdal (2017).
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Table 1 Description of welfare dimensions and indicators
Dimension Indicator Level Construction
Income Equivalized 1 First quartileb
annual net 2 Second quartileb
incomea 3 Third quartileb
4 Fourth quartileb
Health Self-reported 1 Very bad
health 2 Bad
3 Fair
4 Good
5 Very good
Education Highest ISCED 1 Pre-primary, primary, and lower secondary
level obtained 2 Upper secondary and post-secondary
3 Firstc and secondd stage tertiary
Notes: a) Net income after transformation using equivalence scale weights. b) Quartiles are based
on the EU distribution of PPP-adjusted real income in 2005. c) Not leading to an advanced
research qualification. d) Leading to an advanced research qualification.
both been affected by the financial and economic crisis (e.g., Stuckler et al., 2009, Ken-
tikelenis et al., 2011, OECD, 2013a). The inclusion of these three particular dimensions
also enables us to make interesting comparisons between our findings and welfare indices
such as the HDI (UNDP, 2014) and the MPI (Alkire and Apablaza, 2016). Both of these
indices use a weighting scheme and include indicators of health, education, and some
measure of standard of living, typically income. The dimensions and indicators used in
the present paper are described below and briefly summarized in Table 1.
We use individual equivalized annual net income as an indicator in the income di-
mension and correct it using PPP to facilitate cross-country comparisons.13 Using EU
quartiles in 2005 as thresholds, a four-level indicator is constructed. All incomes in 2009
and 2013 are deflated using the consumer price index (CPI). The indicator in the health
dimension is self-reported health ranging from 1 (Very bad) to 5 (Very good); i.e., a five-
level indicator. It includes different aspects of subjective health including physical, social,
13Equivalized total net income uses the OECD-modified scale (first proposed by Hagenaars et al.,
1996). This assigns a weight of 1 to the first adult in the household, a weight of 0.5 to each additional
member of the household aged 14 and over, and a weight of 0.3 to household members aged less than
14. The household’s total net income is divided by this equivalized number of persons to get equivalized
total net income (per person in the household). See OECD (2013b) for more information.
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and emotional function and biomedical signs and symptoms. In the education dimension,
we use the highest ISCED level obtained in three levels from 1 to 3, where 3 is best.14
The three indicators imply 4 · 5 · 3 = 60 different outcomes. To identify dominances
using definition (i), it is required to check 116,424 inequalities (Sampson and Whitaker,
1988). An illustration of the data setup that enables identification of FOD using the code
available from the authors is shown in Table A4 in Appendix 4 using sample data for
Germany in 2005 for all outcomes.
5 Results
Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the one-dimensional and multidimensional analyses in 2005, 2009,
and 2013 respectively. ”I” indicates that the row country dominates the column country
in the income dimension. Similarly ”H” indicates dominance in the health dimension and
”E” indicates dominance in the education dimension. The absence of the indicator(s)
implies that there is no dominance in the relevant dimension(s). A gray cell indicates
multidimensional dominance (MD), which is tested using definition (i) in Section 3. Note
that the column totals for I, H, E, and MD yield the total number of times the column
country is dominated by another country in each dimension (I, H, and E) and in the
multidimensional analysis, respectively.15 The corresponding row totals yield the total
number of times a country is dominant in the three different dimensions and in the
multidimensional analysis.
Table 5 shows the temporal FOD results in both the one-dimensional and the multidi-
mensional analyses. For each row country, an ”I”, ”H”, and/or ”E” in column 2 indicates
14The ISCED (International Standard Classification of Education) is developed by UNESCO (United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) to facilitate cross-country comparisons of
education systems since these vary in terms of structure. We use the ISCED 1997, which ranges from 0
(pre-primary education) to 6 (second stage of tertiary education); see UNESCO (2006).
15Since definition (i) in Section 3 uses weak inequalities rather than strict ones, a country will always
dominate itself. For simplicity, these ”self-dominances” are not included in Tables 2 through 4, nor in
the remainder of the paper.
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Table 5 Temporal first order dominances
Deteriorations over time Improvements over time
05 dom 09 05 dom 13 09 dom 13 09 dom 05 13 dom 05 13 dom 09
AT IH IH I E E
BE IE IE HE
CY I IE E HE
CZ IHE IE IE
DE HE HE E
DK H H E E IE
EE I IE IE E
EL H IH I E E E
ES I IE IE HE
FI IE IE E
FR IE IE IE
HU I IHE HE E
IE H IH IE IE E
IT I I IE E E
LT IE IE E
LU I IH I E E E
LV I IHE IHE E
NL IH IHE E E
PL I IHE IHE HE
PT I HE HE E
SE IHE IE E
SI I I HE HE HE
SK I IE E
UK I I IH H
Ia 3 6 15 16 12 3
Hb 3 5 3 10 6 5
Ec 0 0 0 21 23 23
MDd 0 0 0 3 2 0
Notes: See Table A1 in Appendix 1 for an abbreviation list of EU member states’ names. For
each row country, an ”I” in column 2 indicates that 2009 dominates 2005 in the income
dimension; i.e., when only income is considered. An ”I” in column 3 indicates that 2013
dominates 2005 and so forth. Similarly, ”H” indicates dominance in the health dimension and
”E” indicates dominance in the education dimension. The absence of the indicator(s) implies that
there is no dominance in the relevant dimension(s). A gray cell indicates multidimensional
dominance; i.e., when all three dimensions are considered simultaneously. For example, Belgium
in 2013 dominates 2009 in the health (H) and education (E) dimensions, but not in the income
(I) dimension nor multidimensionally (absence of gray cell). a) Income. b) Health. c) Education.
d) Multidimensional.
that 2009 dominates 2005 in the relevant dimension(s). A gray cell indicates multidimen-
sional dominance (MD) of 2009 over 2005. Similarly, the presence of one or more of these
in column 3 indicates, for each row country, that 2013 dominates 2005, and so forth.
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Spatial FOD comparisons
As seen from Tables 2 through 4, several spatial multidimensional dominances are iden-
tified. In 2005, 45 dominances are found (Table 2), whereas 40 and 43 dominances are
found in 2009 and 2013, respectively (Tables 3 and 4, respectively).16 The multidimen-
sional dominances are largely driven by a few countries that either dominate several others
or are dominated often. For example, in 2005 Germany dominates seven countries, Aus-
tria dominates six countries, and Portugal is dominated by 14 countries (Table 2). The
dominated countries are most often southern and eastern European countries (Hungary,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, and Slovenia), whereas the dominant countries
are most often northern and western European countries (Austria, Germany, Ireland, the
Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). As mentioned, both the HDI (UNDP,
2014) and the MPI (Alkire and Apablaza, 2016) yield rankings where northern and west-
ern European countries are ranked higher than southern and eastern European countries.
This is generally consistent with our findings.17
The following dominances are persistent in all the spatial analyses (i.e., dominance in
2005, 2009, and 2013 is found): Austria, the United Kingdom, and Luxembourg persis-
tently dominate Italy and Portugal; Germany dominates Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and
Portugal; Estonia dominates Latvia; Ireland and the Netherlands both dominate Spain,
Italy, and Portugal; and Sweden dominates Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal,
and Slovenia. However, several dominances do change with the year of spatial analysis.
For example, Belgium dominates Italy in both 2009 and 2013 but not in 2005, as is also
the case for Sweden dominating Spain, the United Kingdom dominating Latvia in 2005
16The maximum number of potential dominances for n countries is (n2 − n)/2. n is raised to the
second power to obtain all country combinations. The subtraction of n in the nominator is to exclude
self-dominance, whereas the 2 in the denominator is due to the fact that if country A dominates country
B, B cannot dominate A. Since n = 24 in this paper, the maximum number of potential dominances is
(242 − 24)/2 = 276.
17Note that the years of analysis in Alkire and Apablaza (2016) are 2006, 2009, and 2012, where only
2009 is somewhat directly comparable.
16
but not in 2009 and 2013, and so on.
The importance of multidimensional analyses of population welfare is well illustrated
by considering Table 2 and noting that, for example, Sweden dominates Spain in all three
dimensions analyzed separately in 2005. However, in the multidimensional analysis, no
dominance is found (as indicated by the absence of a gray cell). The same is the case in
2009 for Cyprus dominating Italy and Sweden dominating Denmark, and in 2013 for the
United Kingdom dominating Spain in all three dimensions but not multidimensionally.
This illustrates that dominance in all the included dimensions analyzed separately does
not imply multidimensional dominance.
The Copeland scores (normalized to the interval [−1; 1]) associated with the spatial
FOD analyses are shown in Table 6 with the countries being ranked accordingly. We
observe that almost no northern or western European countries are in the bottom half
of the ranking and that almost no southern and eastern European countries are in the
top half of the ranking. In addition, the rankings seem largely consistent over time. For
example, Germany and Sweden are consistently ranked first, second, or third, the Czech
Republic and Slovakia have a Copeland score of zero in all three years, and Latvia, Italy,
and Portugal are consistently ranked 21st, 23rd, and 24th, respectively.
Despite the importance of a multidimensional approach to welfare comparisons, some
information can still be gained by the one-dimensional analyses, since one-dimensional
FOD is a necessary (though insufficient) condition for multidimensional FOD. The one-
dimensional analyses can therefore give an indication about within which dimensions(s)
a country is lagging behind. In the income dimension, the most dominant countries are
clearly northern and western European countries; e.g., Luxembourg dominating all of the
23 other countries in all three years, Austria dominating between 19 and 21 countries in
the three years, and so on. The southern and in particular eastern European countries are
most often dominated in the income dimension; e.g., Hungary, Latvia, and Lithuania being
dominated by 20 or more countries in 2013. When considering the health dimension, the
pattern is mostly similar. For example, Latvia, Lithuania, and Portugal are all dominated
by more than 20 countries in 2013. The countries most often dominated in the education
17
Table 6 Copeland score and corresponding ranking of EU member states
2005 2009 2013
Rank Country Score Rank Country Score Rank Country Score
1 DE 0.304 1 SE 0.348 1 SE 0.391
1 UK 0.304 2 DE 0.304 2 DE 0.261
3 AT 0.261 3 IE 0.130 3 CY 0.130
3 SE 0.261 3 NL 0.130 3 IE 0.130
5 IE 0.130 3 UK 0.130 3 NL 0.130
5 NL 0.130 6 AT 0.087 6 AT 0.087
7 BE 0.087 6 BE 0.087 6 BE 0.087
7 CY 0.087 6 FI 0.087 6 DK 0.087
7 FI 0.087 6 FR 0.087 6 FR 0.087
7 LU 0.087 6 LU 0.087 6 LU 0.087
11 DK 0.043 11 CY 0.043 6 SI 0.087
11 EL 0.043 11 DK 0.043 6 UK 0.087
11 FR 0.043 11 EL 0.043 13 FI 0.043
14 CZ 0 14 CZ 0 14 CZ 0
14 EE 0 14 EE 0 14 EL 0
14 SK 0 14 SK 0 14 SK 0
17 PL -0.087 17 HU -0.043 17 EE -0.043
18 LT -0.130 18 LT -0.087 17 PL -0.043
19 ES -0.174 18 PL -0.087 19 LT -0.087
19 SI -0.174 18 SI -0.087 20 ES -0.130
21 HU -0.217 21 ES -0.130 21 HU -0.174
21 LV -0.217 21 LV -0.130 21 LV -0.174
23 IT -0.261 23 IT -0.391 23 IT -0.435
24 PT -0.609 24 PT -0.652 24 PT -0.609
Notes: The Copeland scores are normalized to the interval [−1; 1]. If two or more countries have
the same Copeland score, they are ordered alphabetically.
dimension seem to be particularly southern European and only some eastern European
countries, though Luxembourg is dominated 14 times in 2013. For example, Greece, Spain,
Italy, and Portugal are dominated between 11 and 20 times in 2013 whereas Germany,
Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, and Sweden all dominate ten or more countries in the same
year.
Temporal FOD comparisons
The temporal FOD analyses yield five multidimensional dominances (Table 5), namely
that 2009 dominates 2005 for the Czech Republic, and both 2009 and 2013 dominate 2005
for Latvia and Poland. Latvia and Poland have thus experienced a dominance improve-
18
ment in multidimensional welfare in both 2009 and 2013 compared to 2005, whereas the
improvement in the Czech Republic from 2005 to 2009 is not persistent when comparing
2005 and 2013. Noticeably, no countries have experienced a multidimensional dominance
deterioration in welfare over time (i.e., over the course of the financial and economic
crisis). This is consistent with the HDI (UNDP, 2014) where no European country has
experienced a lower HDI in 2013 compared to 2005.
The one-dimensional temporal results yield several dominances. In the income dimen-
sion, 2005 dominates 2009 and 2009 dominates 2013 (and, hence, 2005 dominates 2013
due to transitivity) for Austria, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom. This implies
that these countries have experienced an unambiguous dominance deterioration of the
income distribution over the entire time period. On the contrary, the Czech Republic and
France have both experienced an unambiguous dominance improvement in the income
distribution over the entire time period, since 2013 dominates 2009 and 2009 dominates
2005 (again, this implies that 2013 dominates 2005 due to transitivity). Several changes
in the income distribution between these two extremes occur – for example, Estonia ex-
periencing an improvement in 2009 and 2013 compared to 2005 (2009 and 2013 dominate
2005) and a deterioration in 2013 compared to 2009 (2009 dominates 2013). As a last
example, the Netherlands has experienced an improvement between 2005 and 2009 (2009
dominates 2005) but a deterioration between 2009 and 2013 (2009 dominates 2013). No
clear pattern is present as to which parts of Europe have experienced a dominance im-
provement or deterioration of the income distribution over the time period considered.
Importantly, but not surprisingly, 15 countries have experienced a deterioration in the
income distribution from 2009 to 2013, whereas only the Czech Republic, Denmark, and
France have experienced an improvement. This is in contrast to the two other compar-
isons (2005 with 2009 and 2013, respectively), where 12 to 16 countries have experienced
improvements and three to six countries have experienced a deterioration.
In the health dimension, Poland and Slovenia have experienced an unambiguous im-
provement, since 2013 dominates 2009 and 2009 dominates 2005. No countries have
experienced an unambiguous deterioration over the entire time period. There is no clear
19
geographical pattern with respect to improvements or deteriorations in the health dis-
tribution over the time period. The overall result for education is clearer: no country
has experienced a deterioration in the education distribution, only improvements have
occurred, with 21 out of the 24 countries experiencing unambiguous improvements over
the entire time period. 2009 does not dominate 2005 for Austria and Slovakia; however,
2013 dominates both 2005 and 2009. The United Kingdom is the only exception since no
improvements were found in the entire time period analyzed.
In general, there seems to have been a significant dominance deterioration in the in-
come distribution in European countries between 2009 and 2013, which is not surprising
considering the financial and economic crisis. The number of countries experiencing im-
provements in health is largely constant, yet with a small decline between 2009 and 2013,
and the same (large) number of countries are consistently experiencing an improvement
in the distribution of education.
6 Discussion
A country bias in self-reported health has been found in the literature. For example,
Ju¨rges (2007) finds that Denmark and Sweden tend to overrate their self-assessed health,
whereas particularly France, Germany, Spain, and Italy tend to underrate it compared to
a constructed index of the prevalence of chronic conditions and physical health measures.
Focusing on dominances in the health dimension in Tables 2 through 4, we cannot rule
out that, for example, Denmark dominating Spain in 2005 in the health dimension is
due to Danes overrating their self-assessed health (and/or Spaniards underrating theirs).
Whether or not this has an impact on the results is not evident. An underrating of
health in, say, Italy may not necessarily mean that Italy is dominated by, say, Sweden
in the health dimension. However, it is worth noting that Denmark and Sweden do not
consistently dominate France, Germany, Spain, and Italy in the health dimension. These
results do not yield clear evidence about whether or not the self-reported health measure
is adequate in describing population health. It does, however, indicate that no clear trend
is found across all countries.
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Though the FOD approach is theoretically well founded, a few empirical limitations
are worth noting. First, as discussed in Section 3, the FOD approach, and other robust
methods that do not rely on a weighting scheme, may yield an indeterminate result where
no dominance is found when comparing two countries. For example, 43 out of the potential
276 dominances are found in 2013 (Table 4). This provides limited information about the
relative welfare of all the populations and makes us unable to obtain a complete ranking
of all EU member states, unlike what can be found using the HDI and the MPI. As shown
in Section 5, the Copeland (1951) method can be used as a measure of the tendency to
outperform other countries as an overall relative indicator of population well-being (Arndt
et al., 2016). However, this does not guarantee a complete ranking as in the present paper,
where some countries have the same Copeland score. But the dominances we do observe
are the only comparisons that provide unambiguous proof that the dominant country is
”better off” than the dominated. A complete ranking obtained by alternative methods,
although convenient, would be obtained due to the additional more restrictive assumptions
underlying these methods and/or the assumptions about the dimensions.
Second, the FOD approach provides no information about whether a dominant distri-
bution is marginally or substantially better than the dominated distribution. For example,
our finding that the Netherlands dominates Italy in 2013 provides no information about
whether the welfare distribution in the Netherlands is much better or only slightly better
than the welfare distribution in Italy. One can use bootstrapping to obtain an empirical
probability of observing dominances under re-sampling to mitigate this limitation (Arndt
et al., 2012).
Third, some dimensions that have been shown to have an impact on individuals’ well-
being (and hence on population welfare) cannot be included in a FOD analysis. For
example, Delhey (2004) shows that besides income, education, and health, dimensions
such as partnership and employment status are significant in explaining life satisfaction
for individuals in European countries after controlling for characteristics such as gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita, political freedom, and more. However, partnership
may not be suitable in a FOD analysis since the dimension is not ordinal in nature. One
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cannot say that being single is worse (or better) than having a partner.
As with any measure of welfare using non-continuous indicators, FOD is sensitive
to the threshold(s) between levels.18 However, the inclusion of multi-level indicators
mitigates this sensitivity.19 As an example, consider Greece and Spain and the single
indicator in the health dimension in Table 2. Greece does not dominate Spain, nor does
Spain dominate Greece. However, consider aggregating the health dimension’s five levels
into a binary indicator. Suppose that we I) aggregate being in very bad, bad, and fair
health into ill health, and being in good and very good health into decent health, or
II) aggregate being in very bad, and bad health into ill health, and being in fair, good,
and very good health into decent health. The only difference between I and II is thus
that fair health is included in ill health in the former and in decent health in the latter.
When we use the aggregation in I, the shares of the population in the two categories
are 0.2318 in ill health and 0.7682 in decent health in Greece and 0.2564 in ill health
and 0.7436 in decent health in Spain. Hence, Greece dominates Spain. On the contrary,
using the aggregation in II, the share of the population in the two categories are 0.0877
in ill health and 0.9123 in decent health in Greece and 0.0680 in ill health and 0.9320 in
decent health in Spain. Hence, Spain dominates Greece; i.e., the conclusion is reversed.
Different threshold(s) between levels can thus alter conclusions about population welfare
rankings. A finer subdivision of indicators because of the inclusion of multi-level indicators
(as opposed to binary indicators) will thus lower the risk of threshold choices impacting
results. Appendix 5 shows the multidimensional FOD analyses using binary indicators
rather than the multi-level ones used in Section 5.
18For example, measures such as the headcount ratio (see e.g., Sen, 1976 or Foster et al., 1984). Note
that this is the case both if the indicator is ordinal in nature (as self reported health) or constructed from
a cardinal variable (such as income).
19Though in a slightly different set-up, see also Hussain et al. (2016) for an example of refining
dimensions to analyze the ”depth” of FOD.
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7 Conclusion
We compare multidimensional welfare in EU member states before, during, and after
the financial crisis both spatially and temporally using first order dominance (FOD) on
multi-level indicators. Implicitly or explicitly, weighting schemes are used in most multi-
dimensional analyses of welfare. Our approach enables us to make comparisons of multi-
dimensional population welfare that are robust to different weighting schemes. We add to
the existing literature by using multi-level indicators of dimensions thus avoiding simpli-
fied welfare comparisons relying on binary indicators. In addition, the use of multi-level
indicators of dimensions mitigates one of the challenges common to all welfare methods
using non-continuous indicators, namely that they are sensitive to the thresholds between
levels. We add to the scarce literature applying FOD on developed countries, and we
stress the importance of multidimensional welfare analyses since dominance in each single
dimension is merely a necessary but insufficient condition for multidimensional dominance.
Several dominances between European member states are found in all the three years
analyzed. These are largely driven by relatively few countries which either dominate or
are dominated by quite a few other countries. In particular, the dominated countries
are most often southern and eastern EU member states, whereas the dominant countries
are most often northern and western European member states. This is consistent with
the existing literature. The ranking of countries using the Copeland method does not
vary much in the three years analyzed. northern and western European countries are
consistently ranked higher than southern and eastern European countries. We find that
only a few countries have experienced temporal multidimensional improvements in welfare,
namely the Czech Republic, Latvia, and Poland, and that no countries have experienced a
dominance deterioration from 2005 through 2013. Thus, while the financial and economic
crisis has had major impacts on especially income both at the individual and country level,
the EU member states’ broadly defined multidimensional welfare has not unambigously
deteriorated during this period.
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Appendix 1 Abbreviation list
Table A1 Abbreviations for included EU member
states and regional groupings
Abbreviationa Country Regiond
AT Austria Western Europe
BE Belgium Western Europe
CY Cyprus Southern Europe
CZ Czech Republic Eastern Europe
DE Germany Western Europe
DK Denmark Northern Europe
EE Estonia Eastern Europe
ELb Greece Southern Europe
ES Spain Southern Europe
FI Finland Northern Europe
FR France Western Europe
HU Hungary Eastern Europe
IE Ireland Northern Europe
IT Italy Southern Europe
LT Lithuania Eastern Europe
LU Luxembourg Western Europe
LV Latvia Eastern Europe
NL Netherlands Western Europe
PL Poland Eastern Europe
PT Portugal Southern Europe
SE Sweden Northern Europe
SI Slovenia Eastern Europe
SK Slovakia Eastern Europe
UKc United Kingdom Northern Europe
Notes: a) In line with the EU abbreviations rules, we use the
two letter ISO code (ISO 3166 alpha-2) as abbrevations except
for b) EL instead of GR for Greece, and c) UK instead of GB
for the United Kingdom (Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
(European Union, 2011, section 7.1.1.). d) We use the United
Nations’ M49 standard (UNSD, 1999) for the grouping of
countries to specific regions. However, for linguistic simplicity,
we include the Baltic member states (Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania) in the group of eastern European countries, i.e.,
separately from the other included northern member states
(Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom).
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Appendix 2 Illustration of LCSs
Table A2 illustrates all LCSs in the bivariate case with binary indicators. Let dimension
A be the row dimension and dimension B be the column dimension. In each dimen-
sion an individual can either be in outcome 0 or 1, where 1 is best. This yields four
LCSs in total: LCS1 = {(0, 0)}, LCS2 = {(0, 0), (0, 1)}, LCS3 = {(0, 0), (1, 0)}, and
LCS4 = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0)}.20 To check for FOD between two distributions f and g us-
ing definition (i), one simply has to check that the following four inequalities are satisfied:
i1) g(0, 0) ≤ f(0, 0)
i2) g(0, 0) + g(0, 1) ≤ f(0, 0) + f(0, 1)
i3) g(0, 0) + g(1, 0) ≤ f(0, 0) + f(1, 0)
i4) g(0, 0) + g(0, 1) + g(1, 0) ≤ f(0, 0) + f(0, 1) + f(1, 0)
Table A2 Illustrating all LCSs, bivariate and binary
LCS1 LCS2 LCS3 LCS4
B B B B
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
A
1
A
1
A
1 ·
A
1 ·
0 · 0 · · 0 · 0 · ·
Note: A gray dotted cell indicates that the outcome is part of the relevant LCS.
20The fifth LCS that includes all outcomes is redundant since the probability mass functions both sum
to 1.
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Appendix 3 Sample sizes
Table A3 Samples sizes for EU-SILC data
2005 2009 2013
Countrya No. obs. Percent No. obs. Percent No. obs. Percent
AT 10,413 2.95 11,049 3.06 10,938 3.15
BE 9,966 2.82 11,652 3.23 11,592 3.34
CY 8,997 2.55 7,553 2.09 10,980 3.16
CZ 7,826 2.21 16,829 4.67 11,602 3.34
DE 24,976 7.08 23,824 6.61 22,540 6.49
DK 5,956 1.68 5,866 1.62 5,429 1.56
EE 9,643 2.73 8,724 2.42 10,106 2.91
EL 12,381 3.51 15,045 4.17 15,318 4.41
ES 30,276 8.58 30,418 8.44 26,429 7.61
FI 10,904 3.09 9,952 2.76 10,756 3.1
FR 18,749 5.31 20,102 5.58 20,563 5.92
HU 14,663 4.15 20,380 5.65 21,270 6.13
IE 12,030 3.41 9,898 2.74 9,442 2.72
IT 47,311 13.41 42,657 11.84 36,612 10.55
LT 9,919 2.81 9,518 2.64 8,195 2.36
LU 7,525 2.13 8,623 2.39 7,996 2.30
LV 7,913 2.24 12,066 3.35 12,112 3.49
NL 9,347 2.65 9,724 2.69 10,102 2.91
PL 37,671 10.68 29,229 8.11 27,804 8.01
PT 10,702 3.03 11,101 3.08 14,008 4.03
SE 6,035 1.71 7,538 2.09 6,084 1.75
SI 8,287 2.34 9,282 2.57 9,001 2.59
SK 12,877 3.65 13,773 3.82 13,220 3.81
UK 18,282 5.18 15,350 4.26 14,855 4.28
Totalb 352,649 100.00 360,153 100.00 346,954 100.00
Notes: For each row country, the numbers in columns 2, 4, and 6 indicate the sample
sizes (number of observations) in the EU-SILC data in 2005, 2009, and 2013,
respectively. Similarly, for each row country, columns 3, 5, and 7 indicate the percent
of total observations in 2005, 2009, and 2013, respectively. a) See Table A1 in
Appendix 1 for an abbreviation list of EU member states. b) Difference in total of
percentages due to rounding.
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Appendix 4 Data structure
Table A4 Example of data structure using sample data
for Germany in 2005.
Education = 1
Health
1 2 3 4 5 Total
Income
1 0.06 0.28 0.73 0.63 0.28 1.98
2 0.13 0.61 1.78 1.95 0.79 5.27
3 0.13 0.52 1.79 2.55 1.10 6.09
4 0.14 0.30 1.09 1.95 1.17 4.65
Total 0.46 1.71 5.39 7.09 3.34 17.99
Education = 2
Health
1 2 3 4 5 Total
Income
1 0.11 0.49 1.15 1.33 0.28 3.36
2 0.18 1.14 3.82 4.70 1.18 11.01
3 0.21 1.20 5.68 8.47 2.14 17.70
4 0.14 0.87 4.84 8.71 2.96 17.53
Total 0.65 3.70 15.49 23.20 6.55 49.60
Education = 3
Health
1 2 3 4 5 Total
Income
1 0.05 0.20 0.43 0.65 0.14 1.47
2 0.13 0.41 1.44 1.83 0.45 4.26
3 0.10 0.62 2.93 4.54 1.02 9.22
4 0.11 0.79 4.36 9.40 2.80 17.46
Total 0.38 2.03 9.17 16.42 4.41 32.42
Suma 100.00
Notes: Percentage of the German population in the 60 different
outcomes in 2005 as estimated using the sample from EU-SILC. a)
Sum of the three sum of totals (17.99, 49.60, and 32.42). Differences
in totals and sum are due to rounding.
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Appendix 5 Binary FOD analyses
As mentioned, applications of FOD in a welfare context have until now used binary
indicators. To show the consequences of using multi-level indicators instead of binary ones,
analyses similar to those in Section 5 but using binary indicators have been conducted.
Instead of applying the multi-level indicators outlined in Table 1, we combine the levels
into binary outcomes as shown in Table A5, where the second column from the right shows
the multi-level indicators applied in the previously reported results, and the rightmost
column shows how the multi-level indicators are aggregated into binary indicators.21
The results are shown in Tables A6 through A9. These are the analogous of Tables 2
through 5, the only difference being that the results are obtained using the binary indi-
cators described Table A5. Naturally, the multidimensional binary analyses yield several
more dominances than the corresponding multidimensional multi-level analyses.22 In par-
ticular, we never obtain an indeterminate result in each dimension analyzed separately
Table A5 Description of welfare dimensions and
binary indicators
Dimension Indicator Multi-level Binary
Income Equivalized 1
}
1
annual net 2
income 3
}
2
4
Health Self-reported 1
}
1
health 2
3
 24
5
Education Highest ISCED 1
}
1
level obtained 2
3
}
2
Note: See Table 1 for further information.
21Other aggregation thresholds have been used as well. While the results naturally are sensitive to
the threshold choice, the ones shown in Table A5 have been chosen to exemplify the difference between
multi-level and binary indicators.
22In general we will observe weakly more dominances as the number of outcome combinations decrease.
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since the distribution in a given dimension is fully described by a single number, e.g.,
those who are worse off. In the binary analyses, we obtain between 138 and 149 mul-
tidimensional dominances, i.e., around three and a half times more than we do in the
multi-level analyses. The corresponding Copeland scores are shown in Table A10.
The overall results are similar to those obtained in the multilevel analyses, i.e., the
countries most often dominated are southern and eastern European member countries,
and the dominant countries are mostly northern and western European member states.
The Copeland scores using binary indicators are also similar to the ones using multilevel
indicators where almost no northern or western European countries are in the bottom half
of the ranking and almost no southern and eastern European countries are in the top half
of the ranking. Though the use of binary indicators enables us to more easily compare
European countries and to obtain a more complete ranking, the trade-off is whether the
binary indicators adequately describe the distribution of the population in the dimensions
considered, or if we are willing to obtain (weakly) fewer dominances by more precisely
dividing the population into multidimensional and multi-level outcomes.
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Table A9 Temporal first order dominances using binary indicators
Deteriorations over time Improvements over time
05 dom 09 05 dom 13 09 dom 13 09 dom 05 13 dom 05 13 dom 09
AT IHE IH IH E E
BE IHE IHE IHE
CY I I IHE HE HE
CZ H IHE IHE IE
DE I I IH HE HE E
DK H H H IE IE IE
EE H H I IE IE HE
EL H IH IH IE E E
ES I IHE IHE HE
FI H H IH IE IE E
FR H H H IE IE IE
HU I I IHE HE HE
IE H IH IHE IE E
IT I I IHE HE HE
LT IH IHE IHE E
LU I IH IH HE E E
LV IH IHE IHE E
NL H IH IHE IE E
PL I IHE IHE HE
PT IH IHE IHE E
SE I IHE IHE HE
SI I I IHE HE HE
SK IHE IHE IHE
UK IE IH IH H E E
Ia 4 9 19 20 15 5
Hb 6 10 14 18 14 10
Ec 2 0 0 22 24 24
MDd 1 0 0 15 9 2
Notes: As in Table 5.
40
Table A10 Copeland scores and corresponding ranking of EU member states
using binary indicators
2005 2009 2013
Rank Country Score Rank Country Score Rank Country Score
1 UK 0.609 1 IE 0.609 1 IE 0.696
2 BE 0.565 2 BE 0.522 2 SE 0.652
2 NL 0.565 2 NL 0.522 3 BE 0.565
4 IE 0.522 2 SE 0.522 4 NL 0.478
5 CY 0.478 5 CY 0.478 5 DE 0.391
5 LU 0.478 5 UK 0.478 6 CY 0.348
7 DE 0.435 7 DE 0.435 6 FR 0.348
7 DK 0.435 8 LU 0.391 8 DK 0.304
7 SE 0.435 9 FI 0.348 8 LU 0.304
10 AT 0.304 10 FR 0.261 8 UK 0.304
10 FI 0.304 11 DK 0.217 11 FI 0.174
12 EL 0.217 12 ES 0.130 12 AT 0.087
13 ES 0.087 13 AT 0.087 13 ES 0.043
14 FR 0.043 14 EL 0.043 14 EL -0.043
15 EE -0.087 15 EE 0 15 EE -0.087
16 IT -0.522 16 LT -0.435 16 SI -0.261
16 LT -0.522 17 SI -0.478 17 LT -0.348
18 SI -0.565 18 IT -0.522 18 IT -0.435
19 CZ -0.609 19 HU -0.565 19 SK -0.478
19 PL -0.609 19 PL -0.565 20 PL -0.565
19 PT -0.609 19 SK -0.565 21 CZ -0.609
22 HU -0.652 22 CZ -0.609 21 LV -0.609
22 LV -0.652 22 LV -0.609 21 PT -0.609
22 SK -0.652 24 PT -0.696 24 HU -0.652
Notes: As in Table 6.
41
